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Abstract
Resilience is a widespread concept and a key priority for the EU. 
We focus on resilience’s relations with stability. These notions have 
been subject to ongoing theoretical debate and have not been clearly 
separated in EU discourses. We explore how resilience and stability 
have been used regarding the Southern and Eastern dimensions of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and suggest how their different 
meanings may be better distinguished and conceptualised. Resilience 
has penetrated the ENP’s discourses unevenly and attracted the 
limited interest of the neighbours. Besides, the EU’s policies will likely 
face numerous practical problems mostly similar to the ENP’s both 
dimensions. The EU’s policies themselves have disturbed stability in 
its neighbourhood, and now, even restoring the old stability would be 
problematic, let alone attaining a more positive one. Furthermore, the 
EU could impose its views regarding stability and/or resilience. Also, 
Brussels could de facto uphold negative stability and/or resilience. 
The Resilience of the EU 
Neighbours to the South and 
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Introduction
The influential interdisciplinary notion of resilience has 
been increasingly widespread in International Relations (IR) 
and the European Union’s policies. The Canadian scientist 
Crawford Holling (1973) introduced it as a distinctive 
ecological term in a 1973 article. One of the central and original 
contributions made by Holling was to distinguish and, in 
a sense, even oppose two notions – those of resilience and 
stability. To cite his example, a “budworm forest community 
is highly unstable, and it is because of this instability that it 
has an enormous resilience” (Holling 1973: 15). It is on the two 
notions of resilience and stability, and the ways they are used in 
policy discourses in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
that our argument in this article is focused. 
Certainly, understandings of resilience in IR need not be 
confined to ecology (Bourbeau 2018). Nevertheless, it is Holling’s 
ideas that have attracted the most attention in social sciences 
and influenced the EU’s adoption of the resilience notion. At 
the same time, Holling’s distinction between resilience and 
stability has often been blurred in theory and practice. It is a 
remarkable example of how academic concepts may assume 
broader, and sometimes ambiguous, meanings over time. 
Thus, we do not consider Holling to be exclusively ‘right’ about 
resilience and stability. We only acknowledge that his insights 
have been influential regardless and also that the distinction 
between stability and resilience is heuristically useful, albeit 
in need of further refinement.
Holling’s dynamic understanding of resilience would be 
prima facie much more fruitful for a social science discipline 
such as IR than a static notion of the stability of an ecological 
system. ‘Stability’ as applied to society is always relative; social 
practices are subject to change, even if implicit and/or slow. 
However, the notions of resilience and stability have continued 
to be puzzling. One question is whether resilience can indeed 
account for the dynamism of a society. On the other hand, how 
much instability and fluctuation can a society tolerate to be 
meaningfully called ‘resilient’? People are not budworms; if a 
budworm community manages to be resilient through large-
scale fluctuations of its numbers, to describe in the same terms 
a human society’s resilience seems at least awkward. One can 
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positive feature for society, despite the sometimes-conservative 
ideological connotations that the notion of stability has 
attracted. If yes, should stability always be opposed to resilience, 
or can it be a building block for it?
There have been protracted debates on the resilience/stability 
nexus, as well as on the appropriateness of ‘resilience’ for the 
social sciences. Yet, the literature on the ENP has not sufficiently 
reflected these debates. Regarding policy practice, the EU’s and its 
neighbours’ common discourses have featured both resilience 
and stability. However, the definitions and connections of 
stability and resilience have remained imprecise. Moreover, 
their uses have been uneven across different policy levels and 
the Southern/Eastern dimensions of the ENP. 
Accordingly, we aim in this article at demonstrating how the 
notions of stability and resilience have been used in these 
discourses and suggesting how their different meanings may 
be better distinguished and conceptualised to account for EU 
policies.  
This article’s methodology is inscribed in the growing research 
on resilience as a complex interdisciplinary notion. We build on 
a critical review of approaches to resilience in the literature to 
form our analytical framework. We then apply it by conducting 
a discourse analysis of the sources relevant for the ENP. We try 
not just to review the existing research and sources, but also to 
contribute to resolving the respective research problems and 
identifying policy contradictions. Given a lack of systematic 
studies exploring resilience and stability in the ENP as a whole, 
the application of our theoretical suggestions is deliberately 
broad, covering the ENP’s two dimensions. Our analysis thus 
has some theoretical and empirical novelty. 
Resilience and Stability: theoretical aspects
There are various interpretations of resilience and stability. 
It may be suggested that they are both “essentially contested 
concepts”. Their meanings would be rhetorically debatable. The 
said, however, would not imply that resilience and stability are 
just labels for incommensurable interpretations. Essentially 
contested concepts do not admit of a single ‘final’ definition, 
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specific arguments and controversies that essentially contested 
concepts acquire their meanings (Garver 1978). Accordingly, our 
approach to resilience and stability is intended not to close the 
discussion, but to move it forward. Below, we will give Holling’s 
definitions of resilience and stability, and suggest some 
refinements. Also, resilience and stability are often variously 
connected with fragility and democracy. Fragility may be 
defined as the antonym of resilience, and we do not undertake 
defining democracy: this would be much beyond the scope of 
this paper; we are just interested in how democracy appears 
in specific arguments connected to resilience. Nevertheless, 
neither Holling’s definitions, nor our suggestions are ‘timeless’ 
or ‘universal’ definitions, including in normative terms. They 
are instead tentative heuristic devices that might refine our 
theoretical vision at this stage and be applied to understand 
the EU’s concrete practices better.
In Holling’s (1973: 14) initial formulation, stability referred to 
“the ability of a system to return to an equilibrium state after a 
temporary disturbance”, stability was opposed to fluctuations. 
On the other hand, resilience referred to “the persistence of 
systems and of their ability to absorb change and disturbance 
and still maintain the same relationships between populations 
or state variables” (Holling 1973: 14). Therefore, to repeat 
Holling’s point noted above, a system may be “highly unstable”, 
yet, because of that high instability, it may be very resilient. 
Later, scholars building on Holling’s 1973 paper attempted 
“to define and refine the concepts of stability and resilience” 
(Ludwig, Walker and Holling 1997). 
However, the meanings of resilience and its relations to stability 
have remained one of the principal controversial issues. Often, 
Holling’s original separation of resilience and stability has 
been almost forgotten. 
The issue largely depends on the dominant understanding of 
resilience within a given discipline. Therefore, “[r]esiliency has 
been framed as persistence, adaptation, and transformation” 
(Davoudi 2018: 3). Thus, physics and “some versions of ecology” 
operate with the concept of “engineering resilience” understood 
in terms of “bounce back” and “equilibrium” (Martin and 
Sunley 2015: 4, Table 1; see also Davoudi 2018: 3-4). The concept 
of resilience as developed in other ecological theories, notably 
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(Davoudi 2018: 3; see also Martin and Sunley 2015: 4, Table 1). Yet, 
Simin Davoudi (2018: 3) believes that “[b]oth the engineering and 
the ecological definitions of resilience” rely on “equilibristic” 
and “mechanical” ideas. Davoudi (2018: 4, italics in original) 
adds that there is evolutionary resilience which is considered 
in “complexity theory” and takes into account “ruptures and 
transformations”. Ron Martin and Peter Sunley (2015: 4, Table 
1) discuss a perhaps related understanding of resilience “[f]
ound in psychological sciences and organizational theory’ 
and implying a “positive adaptability” and “bounce forward”. 
Specialists in psychology and medicine increasingly suggest 
understanding resilience as a process (Liebenberg and Moore 
2018; Windle 2011). In general, then, not only Holling, but 
also representatives of some other disciplines have called for 
variously acknowledging resilience’s dynamic features.  
The resilience/stability nexus provokes particularly active 
discussions in the social sciences. For example, as put by Cecile 
de Milliano et al. (2015: 18), resilience is debatable, inter alia, 
regarding whether it contributes to “development objectives”, 
“wider change” or represents “a means of preserving the status 
quo”. Numerous scholars have instead associated resilience with 
the status quo. Lennart Olsson et al. (2015: 2) seem to suggest 
that resilience, when seen as directed against transformation 
and at the same time as normatively ‘good’, is perceived to be 
at odds with “social science focusing on social change over 
stability”. Often, the critics condemn resilience as “reactionary”, 
and aimed “to perpetuate, sustain and reinforce a hegemonic 
status quo of dispossessing, predatory capitalism” (DeVerteuil 
and Golubchikov 2016: 144).
However, there is a growing trend to approach resilience in a 
more multifaceted fashion than critics of neoliberalism have 
often done (Bourbeau 2018; DeVerteuil and Golubchikov 2016; 
Schmidt 2015). For instance, according to Geoff DeVerteuil 
and Oleg Golubchikov (2016: 145), “ [r]esilience is far … less 
inherently sinister and conservative”, therefore, it is not 
fruitful to offer mere “caricatures” of it. Alexander Laufer et al. 
(2018) see resilience as precisely what is needed to tackle the 
problems that necessitate “fundamental changes in patterns 
of behaviour” and “being willing to challenge the status quo” 
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The literature on the European Neighbourhood Policy faces 
further problems. Discussions of resilience here have not been 
very systematic. They have not used to the fullest the wealth of 
ideas accumulated in the general literature on resilience. This 
echoes the situation with the relevant policy discourses within 
the ENP, where resilience has also penetrated unevenly and has 
been defined imprecisely. 
Concerning the literature on the ENP’s Southern dimension, 
systematic studies on resilience are exceedingly rare (though see 
Colombo, Dessì, and Ntousas 2017). Has the political discourse 
mostly been based on traditional notions, the academic 
literature has continued to operate with the old dichotomies 
between these notions (notably between ‘democracy’ and 
‘stability’). 
Consider, for example, an article by Cilja Harders, Annette 
Jünemann and Lina Khatib (2017), which aims to give a 
thorough overview of the state of the EU’s relations with the 
Arab countries. The authors analyse resilience rather briefly 
and do not offer a systematic definition of the notion. Yet, 
they presume that “[i]nstead of democracy, the EU will now 
promote ‘resilience’” (Harders, Jünemann and Khatib 2017: 449). 
Indeed, the EU’s particular uses of resilience might turn out to 
be opposed to democracy in practice, but this leaves open the 
question of whether the very concept of resilience necessarily 
excludes democracy. Harders et al. (2017: 449) also suggest that 
resilience “neatly ties in with the logics of a preference for 
stability and regime survival”. Again, this may echo the EU’s 
discourse which approximates resilience and stability, but 
this does not yet show that these two concepts are identical 
in principle. Note that Harders et al.’s approach is in direct 
opposition to Holling’s initial distinction between resilience 
and stability. Also take a policy brief on Tunisia by Giovanni 
Faleg (2017), which has “fragility” in its title. It, however, does not 
address resilience as the antithesis to fragility, as we may have 
expected given that EU discourse itself opposes resilience and 
fragility, e.g., in the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) (2016: 23). Faleg 
(2017: 8, footnote 10) refers to resilience briefly in a footnote. 
Instead, Faleg (2017: 2) rather sees fragility in opposition to “the 
country’s progress towards stability”. 
As for the ENP’s Eastern dimension, the EU’s policy is analysed 
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Resilience fits into the established tradition along with the 
concepts of ‘normative power’ and ‘external governance’, 
reflecting Brussels’ officially proposed formula “sharing 
everything with the Union but the institutions” (Prodi 
2002). Without actually considering the issue of membership 
prospects of its neighbours, the European Union has relied 
on those indirect ways of monitoring their development that 
would contribute to establishing the norms and values in those 
states similar to those in Europe.
However, some experts opine that the emergence of resilience was 
the result of a gradual process of the EU’s re-conceptualisation 
of its governance strategy in the neighbourhood regions. This 
opinion, for example, was expressed by Elena Korosteleva. 
Furthermore, she identified such an important condition for 
resilience to be effective as forgoing external governance by 
Brussels in the spirit of neoliberal rationality (Korosteleva 2018).
In contrast to the dichotomy mentioned above between stability 
and democracy in the South, the following needs highlighting. 
The start of discussions on the adaptation of resilience to the 
Eastern Neighbourhood demonstrated a clear intention to link 
it to the imperative of reforms. Resilience was proposed to be 
understood not as the EU’s abandoning democracy promotion 
in the East, but as a call to a more comprehensive approach, 
involving the solution of deep problems leading to the weakness 
of statehood and democracy in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
countries (de Waal and Youngs 2015). Moreover, discussions on 
the resilience of the EU’s Eastern neighbours are inseparable 
from the Russian factor. A considerable number of researchers 
in the West believe that Russia is a major threat to the resilience 
of Eastern neighbours. Reforms are perceived as an instrument 
to make those countries less vulnerable to Russia’s influence.
Thus, the above review of the literature points to three 
underlying problems. First, the senses of resilience, its relations 
to stability, and its fruitfulness for the social sciences have 
been subject to debate. Second, stability has been under-
theorised, often seen as a negative feature (at least implicitly), 
and dichotomously opposed to progress and democracy. 
Accordingly, a ‘good’ resilience in much of the literature is 
associated with change, not stability. Third, resilience and 
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Although it would be challenging to conceptualise stability and 
resilience better, we may suggest certain avenues for reflection. 
For one thing, Holling’s very distinction between stability and 
resilience is fruitful for social science. Nevertheless, social 
systems are much more complex than and, in some respects, 
irreducibly different from those ecological. A purely ecological 
approach applied to society would, therefore, be both too 
simplistic and normatively problematic.
Regarding stability, it seems it can have both relatively negative 
and positive senses. The negative sense would refer to attempts 
at conserving a status quo that is not sensitive to the always 
dynamic social practices and the needs of the population. 
However, crucially, stability can have a positive meaning, i.e. 
refer to a degree of order and predictability. In this sense, 
stability is, indeed, not opposed to resilience, but is a building 
block for it. Positive stability would admit of change and even 
presuppose it because long-term stability cannot be maintained 
without considering social dynamics. It involves stable, 
yet flexible enough political institutions. Positive stability 
seems thus a necessary condition for a positive resilience. 
Nevertheless, the two notions are still not identical.
What is then the added value of resilience? We can also 
distinguish between its more positive and negative uses. A 
positive understanding of resilience would ideally involve 
both positive stability, but also the capacities to react to crises 
flexibly and without suffering much damage , and even to 
achieve specific progress. 
On the other hand, one negative sense would rest on a simplified 
understanding of a system’s resilience: if a system has existed 
and somehow survived many crises, then it is assumed to 
be resilient and to need no reform. This understanding may 
be appropriate for ecological systems, but when applied to 
society, it is fraught with potential abuses. It may imply that 
if a society has been able to survive crises somehow, however 
tragic has been their toll, then the society would be ‘resilient’. 
However, whereas a population of budworms from Holling’s 
example, which may “fluctuate widely” and persist can be 
called unstable and yet resilient, we cannot apply the same 
view to human society. Mark Rhinard (2017: 26) notes, rather 
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skilled in improvisation and creativity survive the toughest 
challenges”, and gives the example of “shanty towns” that cope 
with hurricanes better than modern high-rises. Resilience may 
thus get close to the logic of “that which does not kill us makes 
us stronger” (see also Kassis, Artz, Maurovic and Simões 2018). 
However, this is a vulnerable logic. We doubt that we can call a 
community that survives in shantytowns positively ‘resilient’. 
That some people have to be skilled in surviving hardships 
does not mean that they will be able to endure forever, nor that 
efforts to lessen their hardships should be given up (see also 
Hickman 2018). 
Jonathan Joseph (2014) has considered related aspects of 
negative resilience. He argues that the EU’s resilience-building 
in the Horn of Africa is not promoting resilience according to 
the declared objective of strengthening the respective societies. 
Rather, its policies represent “a technique of governance from 
a distance” (Joseph 2014: 286). On the other hand, one of the 
resilience’s effects is “helping to responsibilise institutions 
and populations” (Joseph 2014: 286): the vulnerable societies 
are expected to be somehow ‘resilient’ themselves and to cope 
with crises primarily on their own. Therefore, the EU may still 
retain influence over these societies without, however, bearing 
much of responsibility. 
Two issues need to be addressed here. First, our approach may 
seem too normatively laden. However, in general, IR can hardly 
avoid a normative dimension. In the literature on resilience, 
there is a growing trend to take normative issues into account 
(see also Brand and Jax 2007). Resilient systems get positive 
or negative assessments: e.g., both critical infrastructure and 
criminal activity can be resilient. Several authors have written 
about “both a dark and a bright side” of resilience (Bourbeau 
2018: 30), and about an “equitable resilience” (Matin, Forrester 
and Ensor 2018). Even the critics of the widespread uses of 
resilience may reflect on “the political struggle for just resilience” 
(Davoudi 2018: 6, italics in original). In an influential study on 
social resilience and neoliberalism, Peter A. Hall and Michèle 
Lamont (2013: 2) understand “social resilience” as “the capacity 
of groups of people … to sustain and advance their well-being 
in the face of challenges to it”. They see social resilience as key 
to “successful societies” where people can “live healthy, secure, 
and fulfilling lives” (Hall and Lamont 2013: 2). Thus, Hall’s and 
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and normative. Olsson et al. (2015: 2) agree that “[g]iven the 
controversy around the normativity of resilience, the notions 
of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ resilience need to be studied more”, not 
less. Indeed, any concepts of positive resilience and stability, 
including our own, are abstractions and will be contested in 
many aspects. We do believe our understandings of positive 
and negative senses of these notions highlight values that 
are uncontroversial enough to generate a relatively broad 
consensus. Yet, again, our suggestions are not ‘universal’ or 
‘final’ but intended to understand better the conditions under 
which specific EU policies are closer to this or that type of 
resilience or stability. 
The second issue is that we need to engage with these different 
senses of stability and resilience regardless because they 
are more analytically appropriate to study society, as distinct 
from ecological systems. Resilience has been criticised for 
“overshadowing agency, conflict, and power” (Olsson, Jerneck, 
Thoren, Persson and O’Byrne 2015: 6), i.e., distinctively social 
phenomena that do not arise in ecological systems. However, 
for other scholars, this is a reason not to abandon resilience 
altogether, but to offer understandings of it that would be more 
attuned to social science, which precisely provides for a reason 
to offer an understanding of an “equitable resilience” (see, e.g., 
Matin, Forrester and Ensor 2018). Thus, the very specificity of 
the social, and the issues of contestation, power and change 
that arise in society make stability and resilience normatively 
laden concepts. Unless we engage with this normativity and 
contestation, we risk detaching ourselves form the very social 
debates that we study as scholars. The case under consideration 
especially clearly illustrates it, as the EU itself has consistently 
linked resilience with value-laden concepts such as democracy 
(as the EU sees it). Thus, while we do not offer ‘absolute’ 
definitions of resilience or stability, we still have to engage 
with normative issues raised by the EU itself, and with their 
contradictions, which allows understanding our subject in a 
more nuanced way.  
Resilience and stability in EU’s general discourses
For the first time, the term ‘resilience’ appeared in the 
European Economic Community’s documents in the 1980s and 
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it spread to other internal (e.g., information security, transport, 
job markets, and Eurozone) and external issues (the resilience 
of third countries, especially developing ones) (Korosteleva 
2018: 9-11; Romanova 2017: 18-21). At least since the 2015 ENP 
review, both ‘stability’ and ‘resilience’ have been widely used in 
the EU’s discourse regarding its neighbourhood. However, the 
EU has not clarified specifically what the relationships between 
stability and resilience are. Besides, resilience has penetrated 
the various ENP discourses unevenly. Below, we will first review 
the more general levels of the EU’s discourse, i.e. the level of the 
Global Strategy governing the whole of external action and the 
level of the ENP as a whole. We will then focus on how the higher 
levels of the EU’s discourse are problematically translated into 
the more specific discourses relevant for the Southern and the 
Eastern dimensions of the ENP.
One of the 2015 ENP review’s novelties was its clear prioritisation 
of stability. The relevant Communication (2015: 2) stated that 
“the new ENP will take stabilisation as its main political 
priority in this mandate”. At the same time, the Communication 
introduced ‘resilience’ within the ENP. However, resilience was 
treated in parallel with stability, nearly as its synonym; at least, 
the two terms were not distinguished. For example, according 
to the Communication (2015: 7), “economic development for 
stabilisation” involved “developing a country’s economic 
resilience”. Thus, starting from the 2015 ENP review, the EU has 
not followed, but rather opposed, Holling’s distinction between 
stability and resilience.
Next, the ENP discourse was superimposed by the 2016 EU’s 
Global Strategy. The EUGS did mention “stability” and related 
words. But the EUGS (2016: 18, 23-28) was more specific about 
‘resilience’, introducing it as a separate notion that forms 
one of the EU’s general “priorities”. According to Nathalie 
Tocci (2017: 70), who coordinated the work on the Strategy, “[t]
he term “resilience” was chosen as a priority for two reasons. 
First because resilience is a term that speaks to two policy 
communities…: the security community and the development 
community”; second, because the term “reflected the notion 
of principled pragmatism”. As famously argued by Wolfgang 
Wagner and Rosanne Anholt (2016: 417) based on interviews 
(including with civil servants from some EU bodies), “‘resilience’ 
seemed a perfect middle ground between over-ambitious 
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of stability”. Note that stability is here characteristically 
considered as “under-ambitious”: it is thus undervalued as 
not a goal particularly worth pursuing. Yet, it may be asked if 
stability is indeed too ambitious a goal for the EU, in the sense 
that attaining it often proves problematic, not to speak about 
resilience. 
The Global Strategy (2016: 23) defined resilience as “the ability 
of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and 
recovering from internal and external crises”. ‘Resilience’ was 
opposed to “[f]ragility” in the EUGS (2016: 23). The Strategy (2016: 
25) stated that “repressive states are inherently fragile in the 
long term”. As declared by the Strategy (2016: 24), resilience 
comprises at once “democracy, trust in institutions, and 
sustainable development”. Thus, the document was again 
not specific regarding resilience’s relation with stability (and 
development): i.e. whether resilience was more about the 
capacity “to reform” or about “withstanding and recovering”. 
The later Communication entitled “A Strategic Approach to 
Resilience in the EU’s external action” (2017) did not sufficiently 
clarify links between resilience and stability. While, for 
example, the Communication (2017: 3) stated that resilience 
was needed “to sustain progress”, it also connected resilience 
to “the capacity of a state … to build, maintain or restore its core 
functions, and basic social and political cohesion” and to “the 
capacity … to manage opportunities and risks in a peaceful 
and stable manner”. The “Report on the Implementation of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy Review” (2017: 3) again 
treats ‘stabilisation and resilience’ in parallel. Finally, the 2018 
“Implementation Report” on the EUGS (2018: 8-9) has a section 
on “Resilience and the Integrated Approach” which strongly 
emphasises stability.
Southern Neighbourhood
Currently, the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood lacks both 
positive stability and positive resilience. On the one hand, the 
EU’s norm promotion here has not achieved its stated goals. It 
has been perhaps too fragmentary to make a real difference 
in terms of reforming the Southern neighbours (Harders, 
Jünemann, and Khatib 2017: 438). However, it has been enough 
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with domestic problems of these countries, has contributed to 
their destabilisation. 
The EU’s other policy line has consisted of the de facto 
cooperation with the authoritarian regimes in some of the 
Arab states with a perceived aim of maintaining stability. This 
cooperation has propped up an “authoritarian resilience” (see, 
e.g., Nathan 2003). 
While the EU’s two policy lines seem to be opposed to each other, 
they have largely contributed to similar outcomes. The EU has 
alternately encouraged ‘pro-Western’ civil society organisations 
(while side-lining other important societal actors) and the 
ruling elites. This approach has been espoused instead of a more 
holistic one that would have aimed at both strengthening the 
state’s public institutions (i.e., not only ruling elites’ interests) 
and, at the same time, considering various societal actors. In 
some respects, the EU’s policies have reduced the political and 
economic capacities of the state in those countries, without, 
however, offering an alternative equal to the state in terms 
of ensuring stability or resilience. The Arab nation-states’ 
weakness connected to historical legacies and contemporary 
problems has been exacerbated as the EU has supported some 
of the non-state actors, and “neoliberal economic reform 
increasingly eroded the existing social contracts” (Harders, 
Jünemann, and Khatib 2017: 439). As a result, the EU’s policies 
have disturbed the “old” (indeed, mostly problematic) stability, 
without creating a new one.
Some recent EU policy initiatives crucial for the Southern 
Neighbourhood are puzzling with regard to resilience/stability 
relations. Thus, the discourse on the “External Investment Plan” 
(EIP) (EC n.d.a) has featured both resilience and stability. For 
instance, it referred to resilience in connection to migration 
flows (EC 2017a: 15), and one of the first “Guarantee Tools” 
within this initiative has been “Resilient City Development 
(RECIDE)” (EC n.d.b: 1, 16). However, when explaining the 
rationale behind the launching of the first guarantee tools, 
the Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and 
Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn assessed it as a long-
term investment in the stability and security (EC 2018). 
The European Investment Bank (EIB)’s “Economic Resilience 
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investments in economic resilience will … ideally … contribute 
to enhanced stability in fragile countries” (EIB n.d). Resilience 
here is thus presented as just a tool for enhancing stability, and 
stability as the antithesis to fragility. 
“The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and 
addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced 
persons in Africa” refers to stability in its title. Nevertheless, 
‘resilience’ is widely used in the discourse as well (EC 2017b). Still, 
again, the very understanding of resilience is here connected to 
the idea of “bouncing back” after crises (EC n.d.c).
Besides the above initiatives, however, it seems fruitful to zoom 
in on documents that have been agreed on by both the EU and 
its Southern partners. This would show whether, and to what 
extent, ‘resilience’ has been adopted not only by the EU but also 
by its Southern interlocutors.
‘Resilience’ has hardly penetrated the Union for the 
Mediterranean’s (UfM) strategic level discourse. The Union’s 
“Roadmap for Action” (2017) does not mention resilience. 
Instead, “the three key interrelated priorities” include “regional 
stability, human development and integration” (UfM Roadmap 
for Action 2017: 8, bold type removed). The UfM’s projects fall 
within two categories, “Human Development” and “Sustainable 
Development” (UfM Secretariat n.d.). Indeed, the declared 
priorities have not changed very much over the twenty-four 
years since the Barcelona Declaration (1995). There has been 
conceptual inertia in the UfM, whereby it has built mainly on the 
more traditional notions detached from the resilience discourse.
Turning to the ENP as such, the stress on stability seems to 
be particularly salient in the Southern dimension. Two years 
since the adoption of the EUGS, with its numerous references to 
resilience, its above-mentioned 2018 “Implementation Report” 
mainly returns to stability, at least regarding the Southern 
neighbours. The section of the Report (2018: 8-9) on “Resilience 
and the Integrated Approach” treats stability as a critical 
priority for many of the Southern Neighbourhood’s different 
states, specifically those concerned by the Syrian, Libyan and 
migration crises.  
Regarding the bilateral dimension, on the one hand, ‘resilience’ 
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crisis. Thus, the 2017 “EU Strategy on Syria” has a section entitled 
“Support the resilience of the Syrian population and Syrian 
society” (European Council, Council 2017). It includes references 
to the resilience of the countries hosting Syrian refugees 
(European Council, Council 2017). In general, as regards the 
Syrian situation, ‘resilience’ has been extensively used as 
applied to the problems of refugees. The Agreement on the 
EU’s Trust Fund (2016) is indicative in this respect. Yet, both the 
Strategy and the Agreement also contain references to stability.
On the other hand, beyond the scope of the Syrian problem 
and its consequences, the use of ‘resilience’ has hardly been 
extensive in the bilateral relationships. Thus, the EU-Algeria 
Partnership Priorities up to 2020 (2017: 8) mention ‘resilience’ 
once. Its meaning, however, is linked to the resistance to 
security threats and does not add much to the goals of stability 
and security. The document does not mention ‘fragility’. 
The Partnership Priorities with Jordan for 2016-2018 refer to 
resilience four times. The references in the document (n.d.: 1-3, 
7) are, nevertheless, connected, again, to the Syrian, Palestinian 
and other refugees’ problem, “the Syrian crisis and regional 
instability”, and also to “economic resilience”. The document 
(n.d.: 3) has a single reference to “an already fragile economic 
situation”. The EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities (2016) for 
2016-2020 feature five references to ‘resilience’. The document 
(2016: 3), however, explicitly connects it to ‘stability’ at the outset. 
Only a single reference to resilience presents it as a distinct, 
comprehensive notion: ‘community resilience’, whereby the 
document touches on economic, governance and social issues 
at once. Again, the problems of community resilience are linked 
in the Priorities (2016: 6), inter alia, to the issue of Syrian refugees. 
The other references to resilience in the document (2016: 4, 7, 12) 
concern only the economy and/or infrastructures. ‘Fragility’ is 
not mentioned. In similar documents with Egypt and Tunisia, 
references to resilience are absent (EU-Egypt Partnership 
Priorities 2017-2020. 2017; The EU-Tunisia Association Council 
2018).
To summarise, it seems that the resilience discourse has 
so far penetrated the EU’s relationships with the Southern 
neighbours in an uneven and overall limited and fragmentary 
fashion. ‘Resilience’ has often been used in the initiatives 
which embrace not only the Southern Neighbourhood but also 
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as the EIP and the Trust Fund for Africa). The term has also 
been employed in an economic sense (the ‘Economic Resilience 
Initiative’). Finally, ‘resilience’ has actively been used regarding 
the Syrian problem, and it seems to be the case because the 
crisis has attracted the most attention. Even in this case, 
‘resilience’ has not been clearly distinguished from stability, 
and primarily confined to the specific issue of refugees. In 
other cases, as shown by the EU’s general discourse regarding 
the Southern Neighbourhood and some of the Partnership 
Priorities, ‘resilience’ may be mentioned, but, again, it is not 
consistently separated from stability, and is mostly referred to 
in connection with the specific issues of the refugees and the 
economy. Resilience is rarely considered as a comprehensive 
and multifaceted, innovative notion. In other cases, such as 
the strategic UfM’s documents and the rest of the partnership/
strategic priorities, it has still not found its way in the shared 
agenda of the EU and the partners.
What are then the senses of stability and resilience that the 
EU is or will be promoting in the South? The negative stability 
would involve an essentialist view of the Arab/Muslim cultures, 
the invocations of an “Arab exceptionalism” that putatively 
condemns these societies to the deadlocked choice between 
either dictatorships or chaos. Still, crucially, stability in its 
positive meaning is particularly important for the South and 
is a building block for resilience. The order seems to be taken 
as a top priority by the population of the Southern neighbours 
themselves (see, e.g., Ragab 2017: 61, 70).
It seems that the EU’s discourse approximating stability and 
resilience has partly been a way to recognise the importance 
of a kind of stability to the Southern neighbours. Even so, two 
types of problems arise here. First, the EU has recognised the 
connections of stability and resilience in an imprecise fashion, 
as we have shown. 
Second, there are more empirical problems. While the old 
stability in the South was, undoubtedly, vulnerable, it would 
probably be exceedingly difficult even to return to that stability, 
and still more challenging to build less problematic one. It seems 
that the EU itself is in some situations continuing to destabilise 
the region, notably by refusing to acknowledge the strengths 
of Bashar al-Assad’s rule in Syria. There is also a risk that the 
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stability that neglects deeper political, social, economic and 
environmental problems of the region. For example, as argued 
by Jamil Mouawad (2017: 87), the various international actors’ 
support to the Lebanese ruling elites masked the situation of 
“a fake “stability” in Lebanon. In Mouawad’s view (2017: 83), the 
state institutions were “hollowed out”” by private interests, 
i.e. the elites used the state to their narrow advantages while 
keeping minimal stability in the country. The aid provided by 
international donors helped this stability. Nonetheless, this 
situation did not correspond to either stability or resilience in 
a positive sense (see Mouawad 2017). This old minimal stability 
proved easy to be undermined by the protests since 2019.
Positive resilience in the South is a still more distant prospect. 
Instead, the EU and the Southern neighbours may switch 
to negative sorts of resilience. This may be provoked by the 
difficulties to achieve a more positive situation in the region, by 
the EU’s financial problems and inevitable fatigue regarding the 
South, and/or by the EU’s wielding of resilience as a simplified 
systemic quality or a governance technique that would involve 
a reduction in its responsibility towards the South. 
In the Southern Neighbourhood, there are already cases that 
may exemplify negative resilience. In the Syrian case, without 
a political solution to the crisis and the elimination of hard 
security threats, any discourse on resilience will be empty, 
except, at best, maintaining a minimal resilience of some 
refugees by providing them with financial relief which is 
unable to resolve their long-term problems. So far, the EU has 
not done enough to anticipate a political solution. 
Moreover, what has appeared in the EU’s discourse regarding 
both Syrian refugees and forcibly displaced persons, in 
general, is an emphasis on “self-reliance” (see, e.g., EC 2016a; 
EC, HR/VP 2017b: 5, 6, 23). This emphasis may easily hide 
shifting responsibility on refugees for their problems without 
considering the root causes that made them refugees. Those 
causes are, meanwhile, in part connected to the EU’s policies 
which contributed to destabilisation in the first place.
Turning again to the Lebanon case, as analysed by Mouawad, 
what proved to be ‘resilient’ was the elites’ self-interested 
control over the state. Lebanon had minimal resilience as far 
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altogether (Mouawad 2017: 86). Yet, this situation was “exclusive 
to certain groups” and did not contribute to “institutional 
sustainability or social justice” (Mouawad 2017: 86). As noted 
above, the situation quickly turned into instability.
Finally, the EU’s uses of ‘resilience’ in the case of Palestine 
are illustrative. They mostly seem to avoid tackling the 
fundamental political problems. Consider the “European 
Joint Strategy in Support of Palestine” for the years 2017-2020, 
jointly worked out by the EU and its Member States, as well as 
Norway and Switzerland, which provide development aid to 
Palestine. The document’s (n.d.: 1) title is “Towards a democratic 
and accountable Palestinian State”. The Strategy (n.d.: 30, bold 
type removed) explicitly acknowledges the “dependency” of 
Palestine on foreign aid of “[d]onors [that] have to a certain 
extent contributed to the management of the conflict rather 
than to the achievement of a lasting and inclusive solution”. 
The Strategy (n.d.: 39) is correct, too, in that the “situation” is 
“fragile” and indeed undergoes ‘deterioration’. Finally, the 
document (n.d.: 11) is correct in that this dire diagnosis can be 
overcome only through a “political progress”, without which 
any “sustainable development” would make little sense.
However, the same document (n.d.: 6, bold type removed) also 
presumes “that Palestine will stay under occupation in the 
coming four years”. Paradoxically, then, the Strategy’s declared 
objective of “a democratic and accountable Palestinian State” 
is declared to be practically unattainable within the Strategy’s 
term. There is thus a pessimism regarding a fundamental 
political solution: the document clearly states the problems, but 
still assumes that the occupation will continue. The references 
to resilience should be read in this light. Precisely because a 
political solution is not seen as forthcoming, resilience here 
largely turns from a positive goal into a minimalist tool for 
encouraging the Palestinians to get by as they have done 
before. One reference to resilience in the Strategy (n.d.: 38) 
is to agriculture as a factor of “livelihood resilience”. The 
meaning here concerns just survival. Another reference in the 
document (n.d.: 37) is connected to the goal of “resilient energy 
services”. However, this begs the question as to how energy 
services to Palestinians can be resilient in a positive sense 
if the considerable Israeli control continues unabated. The 
Strategy’s (n.d.: 30, 34) remaining two references to ‘resilience’ 
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are about the resilience of the Palestinians living in Area C, 
the Gaza Strip and/or East Jerusalem, i.e. the territories under 
various but strong forms of Israeli control. The meaning here 
is about somehow ensuring that the Palestinians continue 
to live there. However, if the occupation is unlikely to end, 
according to this same document, then these invocations of 
‘resilience’ can hardly mean much beyond merely encouraging 
the Palestinians to keep coping with their hardships. Thus, as 
long as the EU does not exercise an appropriate pressure on the 
sides of the conflict to reach a fundamental political solution, 
‘resilience’ will at best represent short-term remedies that can 
even divert attention from underlying political issues.
Eastern Neighbourhood
A crucial difference in discussions of the stability and 
resilience of the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood from the 
situation on its southern border is the presence in the East of 
an alternative influence on the region represented by Russia. 
So, it was not fortuitous that the Russian factor had been 
a significant subject of discussions on the resilience of the 
EU Eastern partners. Already since the mid-1990s, Brussels 
has viewed Russia’s bearing on security and development of 
countries in the post-Soviet space as excessive (Commission 
2003; Commission 1996). After 2014, against the backdrop of the 
Russia-Ukraine and Russia-EU conflicts, such Russia’s influence 
came to be perceived exclusively in terms of threats to security, 
spanning that of the military through that of energy. 
At the same time, relations with Russia in some cases can have 
a stabilising effect on the situation in the states of the region. 
Also, their experience in the USSR is not entirely negative. 
Despite the legacy of wide-spread informal practices, the former 
republics had also inherited from the Soviet Union a relatively 
elevated level of socio-economic development. According to the 
Human Development Index, at the time of its disintegration, the 
Soviet Union was significantly ahead of the future EU Southern 
neighbours, approaching such developed western nations 
as the Federal Republic of Germany and the USA (Human 
Development Report 1990: 111). The EU Eastern partners, despite 
the present controversial development parameters, are not 
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An acute exacerbation of the situation along the eastern border 
in 2014 became one of the reasons for the term ‘resilience’ to 
percolate into the foreign-policy and security discourse of 
EU institutions, and in so far as it was about security – into 
the discourse of NATO as well. As was already stated above, 
resilience per se is cited frequently in the core documents on 
the ENP. The key document, defining the specific tasks for the 
Eastern Partnership, which is similar to the UfM Roadmap for 
Action, cites resilience eight times. The main priorities for the 
interaction of the EU with the Eastern partners fully replicate 
the traditional set of areas of the Neighbourhood Policy, namely 
economic co-operation, good governance and institutions, 
energy and transport, and people-to-people contacts. However, 
the emphases on the respective areas are placed differently. 
The 2016 document attaches greater importance to the internal 
parameters and development of Eastern partners, which 
corresponds better with the resilience thinking. Also, like in 
the 2011 Communication (EC, HR/VP 2011), greater emphasis is 
put on supporting public initiatives and actors as forces driving 
European choice in the relevant countries. Particular attention 
is paid to “strategic communication” of the EU in the area of the 
Eastern Partnership, which is an apparent echo of the Russian-
European conflict and disinformation concerns (Joint Staff 
Working Document 2016).
As in the general documents on the ENP, stability is mentioned 
along with resilience, and there is no conceptual difference 
between these notions. However, based on the analysis of the 
text of the ‘20 deliverables’ of the EaP, it can be assumed that 
Brussels sees some sequence in the priority actions — first 
‘stabilising the Eastern Neighbourhood’, and then forming its 
long-term resilience. The question is whether the European 
Union, despite the prevailing negative assessments of Russian 
politics, can see Russia’s role in stabilising the situation in the 
region.
The sectoral documents on the EaP, which do not causally relate 
to security or the conflict with Russia, and those that target 
audiences outside the EU institutions often do not mention 
resilience at all. Such is the case, for example, with the Reports 
from the Commission on Customs Cooperation with the 
eastern neighbouring countries (EC 2016b). In the documents 
dealing with specific Eastern neighbours, resilience is seldom 
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eighteen months of work by the Support Group for Ukraine 
mentions resilience only once, specifically in reference to the 
gas supply for the country during the winter season (Support 
Group for Ukraine 2016). The report from the Commission and 
High Representative on the implementation of the Association 
with Moldova (2018) mentions resilience twice – both in the 
context of “more transparent, efficient, competitive and resilient 
economic environment”. The report from the Commission and 
High Representative on the relations between Armenia and the 
EU under the renewed ENP (2018) cites resilience only once in 
a very general context. Furthermore, it lists traditional areas 
of the reform, which were typical of the early texts on the ENP. 
However, while the frequency of references to resilience in the 
case of the EU’s Eastern neighbours roughly coincides with 
that in the Southern case, there is also some specificity to the 
use of this concept regarding the East. There, resilience is often 
mentioned in connection with the hybrid threats that, in the 
opinion of Brussels, some Eastern neighbours face, and that 
come from Russia. So, on six dozen pages of the EU-Georgia 
Association Agenda, three out of four references to resilience are 
made in regard to hybrid and information threats (Association 
Agenda between the European Union and Georgia, 2017-2020). 
In the EU-Moldova Association Agenda (2017), three out of six 
references to resilience have to do with information security, 
which is not the critical domestic problem of that country.
Terminologically, resilience has not yet become the concept that 
could fundamentally change the essence of the EU’s approach to 
and the content of its interaction with the Eastern neighbours. 
While there is an attempt in the core documents on the ENP 
to integrate resilience into the established line of thought, as 
we go deeper into the analysis of sources, it becomes evident 
that resilience thinking has not yet been formed as the basis 
for the development of the EU’s future policy towards the EaP 
countries.
In this regard, what is essential is the issue of perception of 
resilience by the Eastern neighbours. If the key element of this 
concept, as a governance practice, is the focus on the autonomy of 
those governed in developing their resources for resilience, then 
such practice requires understanding and acceptance of it by the 
EU’s Eastern neighbours. For the moment, as far as one can judge, 
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of the Brussels bureaucracy. Therefore, its use by Chisinau, Kyiv 
or Tbilisi is limited to cases of direct interactions with the EU 
officials (Ministerstvo infrastruktury Ukrainy 2018; Filip 2018). 
Resilience is practically non-existent in the domestic debates by 
the Eastern neighbours about the reforms or security threats. The 
notion of resilience is only aspiring to become at least a boundary 
object – a concept whose depth and unambiguity has been shed 
for the sake of universality, facilitating communication between 
various policies and actors.
The limited level of susceptibility of the EU’s Eastern neighbours 
to resilience discourse does not cancel Brussels’s attempts to 
apply appropriate terminology to them, as well as the utility 
of resilience-stability nexus as an analytical tool. Getting back 
to this topic, it is worth mentioning that the corpus of the 
studied EU documents revealed a few nuances in the promotion 
of stability by Brussels. The positive stability that Brussels 
presumably wishes for the Eastern neighbours is built on such 
a social contract between the democratic state and society 
that would ensure trust in institutions, inclusive and good 
governance, and sustainable development (see the EUGS (2016)). 
Moreover, that positive stability should come about specifically 
by way of borrowing from the experience of the EU, its norms, 
and values.
Examples of negative stability, as seen by the EU, are those 
provided by post-Soviet autocracies (or ‘repressive states’). There, 
one person or a clique of individuals find themselves above the 
law, distributing amongst themselves all the available resources 
and rigidly controlling access to the latter by other social 
groups. Their principal objective is to preserve power. Their 
ability to react effectively to internal and ambient challenges 
is, on the contrary, limited due to the lack of transparency of 
such systems of governance. As a consequence, the State is 
capable of exhibiting stability for a lengthy period; however, an 
unexpected vibration in parameters as a result of some internal 
or ambient shocks can trigger a complete destabilisation or yet 
cause a collapse of statehood, revealing the illusionary nature 
of such stability.
The EU’s attitude to the stability of its Eastern neighbours 
depends on circumstances. Often, the EU cannot forgo tilting 
‘negative stability’ it does not like to advance the prospect of 
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state on conditions defined by Brussels. Meanwhile, negative 
stability needs a gradual and smooth transformation to a more 
positive one. Indeed, to plant those formal institutions would 
be more effective not by confronting the informal practices but 
rather by interacting with some of them (Aliyev 2017). A striking 
example of the vitality of informal practices is the situation 
with the influence of the so-called oligarchs on politics, like the 
one related to European integration in Moldova and Ukraine.
Furthermore, as the post-Soviet experience has shown, 
frequently, such negative stability is preferable to the instability 
with no end. Moreover, just like positive stability, it rests on 
a particular social contract between the ruling elite and a 
reasonable part of the population. A salient example is Belarus. 
Since the mid-1990s, the country has had a political regime 
criticised by the European Union for its absent democracy 
and lack of market reforms. Still, the authority of Alexander 
Lukashenka is predicated on a social contract between him 
and the population, ‘concluded’ as the result of the presidential 
elections in 1994. As local experts describe the content of 
that contract, it involved the citizens’ refusal to take part in 
an unauthorised political activity in exchange for the socio-
economic guarantees (Kaspe 2017: 37-48). As long as those socio-
economic promises are kept, the system will possess a certain 
margin of resilience.
Under these circumstances, the key factor affecting stability in 
Belarus is its relationship with Russia. Since the second half 
of the 1990s, the maintenance of vibrant trade and economic 
relations, rising exports, as well as the energy supplies and 
financial assistance from Russia have allowed the Belarus 
leader to create conditions for a successful realisation of his 
part of the social contract with the population. Likewise, the 
EU’s isolation policy toward the country has prompted it to 
strengthen its relations with Russia, thus de facto making the 
EU a co-author of the negative stability in Belarus.
Negative stability determined the formation of negative 
resilience as a means of constant tactical adaptation to the 
ambient conditions without real progress in quality. The 
resultant economic model in Belarus implies not only the 
imperative for trade and economic orientation toward Russia 
but also the refusal of radical reforms. The preservation of 
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with the state as the principal employer, subsidised agriculture, 
large loss-making enterprises, and a continuous obligation to 
maintain full employment are essential pillars of the Belarus 
socio-economic model (for details, see Zaiko, Romanchuk  2011).
Moreover, the Belarus case illustrates the specificity of the EU’s 
approach to the stability and resilience of Eastern partners. 
This approach features not only self-confidence in possessing 
the know-how about the ‘right’ social, political, and economic 
practices, but also susceptibility to being swayed by the 
geopolitical factor. Under the latter’s influence, what Brussels 
perceives as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ vis-a-vis the Eastern neighbours 
can undergo significant changes. For a long time, Belarus had 
been subject to the policy of isolation by Brussels. The primary 
condition set by Brussels for a revision of its policy was for the 
country to hold transparent and competitive elections. 
The departure from the policy of isolation occurred between 
2008 and 2009, and it was not in response to any significant steps 
on the part of the Belarus leadership toward democratisation. 
The main impetus for changing the EU’s approach was the 
Russo-Georgian conflict of August 2008. It was precisely in 
its aftermath that Brussels decided to get Belarus involved in 
the EaP multilateral dimension. The only condition laid down 
before the Belarus leadership was to refuse to recognise the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
In a similar vein, the perception of the Russian factor as a 
threat to Moldova’s rapprochement with the EU was behind the 
long-standing and unconditional support for the Alliance for 
European Integration (AEI) that came to power in the country 
after 2009. The rise of the Alliance was viewed as the only 
chance for real rapprochement between Moldova and the EU. 
Within a brief period, Moldova was ahead of other states of the 
EaP as judged by the speed and degree of its progress toward the 
EU (The EaP Index 2017). 
That said, Brussels was unwilling to recognise that the actions 
of the governing coalition were a distinct iteration of the 
previous practices by the Party of Communists. This was driven 
by the fear to see pro-Russian political forces rise to power in 
Chisinau. Following each election to the Moldovan Parliament, 
the officials of the EU Member States and institutions would 
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members had not stopped vying with each other for the 
distribution of resources ever since the moment they joined 
their first governing coalition. Even the 2015-2016 Bank fraud 
scandal, which had demonstrated the deep corruptness of the 
state institutions and politicians of the Republic of Moldova, 
did not prompt a corresponding reaction from Brussels. A 
paradoxical situation emerged when one of the key forces of 
public protest against a corrupt pro-European government 
happened to be again a pro-European civil association titled 
“Dignity and Truth Platform” (Kostanyan 2016).
Still, given the circumstances of a confrontation with Russia 
and growing popularity of the pro-Russian forces in Moldova 
(first of all, Party of Socialists), Brussels decided to ignore the 
problem. Faced with an apparent difficulty to form positive 
resilience in the case of European integration of Moldova, the 
European Union acted in a somewhat ambiguous manner. 
Contrary to the idea of relying on civil society, Brussels opted 
to continue cooperation with the governing coalition that had 
discredited itself in the eyes of the population. According to the 
2016 public opinion polls, none of the two dozen top politicians 
in Moldova enjoyed a positive trust rating. (Barometrul de 
Opinie Publică. Aprilie 2016). If following the logic of the EU 
officials, we assume that the level of citizens’ trust in public and 
political institutions is one of the indicators of the effectiveness 
of a social contract, which is the basis of state and societal 
resilience, then it is clear that, unlike in Belarus, such a contract 
is absent in Moldova.
Attempting to separate stability from resilience, as applied 
to social phenomena according to their normative values 
of positive and negative subtypes, is a useful instrument 
of analysis that reveals the nuances of resilience in the EU 
discourse. At the same time, as practice shows, resilience and 
stability of societies and states along the perimeter of the 
European Union have a complex and multi-layered character. 
So, for example, Belarus, where the current situation could be 
described using the concepts of negative stability and negative 
resilience, has a significantly lower level of corruption, higher 
human development indicators, and a higher level of GDP per 
capita than the states actively advancing along the path of 
reforms (Moldova, Ukraine). Additionally, it is difficult to mark 
off certain practices as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ and to distinguish 









XXVI (86) 2020, 
6-41
latter can be used in the shaping of formal institutions, while 
immediate and uncompromising destruction of negative 
stability does not necessarily lead to the development of more 
positive forms of resilience. 
 Conclusions
The above analysis shows both similarities and differences 
between the Southern and the Eastern dimensions in two broad 
respects – (1) in terms of the discursive uses of ‘resilience’ and 
‘stability’ and (2) in terms of the practical problems connected 
to the EU’s policies.
First, in terms of discourse, there are similarities between the 
South and the East with regard to how resilience has been used. 
Although resilience has become a new overarching goal in 
the EU’s discourses regarding its external action and the ENP, 
the specific content of the EU’s understanding of the notion, 
including the relation to stability, has not been very clearly 
stated. Besides, the notion has penetrated the lower discursive 
levels in a limited and fragmentary way. 
Regarding the South, ‘resilience’ has often been used 
in the initiatives which concern not only the Southern 
Neighbourhood, but also Africa and are built around aid and 
development issues; it has also been employed in economic 
senses and concerning the widely-covered Syrian problem 
and refugees (including the sparse references to resilience 
in bilateral documents with some partners). Beyond the 
above (intersecting) contexts, resilience has still not become 
widespread in the shared agenda of the EU and the partners. 
As regards the East, the key strategic document of the Eastern 
Partnership does feature the term ‘resilience’ and a particular 
‘philosophy’ of resilience. However, the main priorities for 
interaction with partners primarily build on the old ones. 
Furthermore, in Eastern Partnership documents that do not 
directly concern security issues and the conflict with Russia 
and aim at audience external to EU institutions, ‘resilience’ 
may be absent altogether. References to resilience in documents 
concerning individual Eastern neighbours are rare and either 
limited to a specific area (energy or economy), or are rather 
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To a large degree, there has been a predictable inertia. The 
relationships between the EU and the neighbours both to the 
South and to the East have continued to draw on the old, more 
traditional concepts than ‘resilience’. The closer one looks at 
the documents, the more one can suggest that a developed 
‘resilience-thinking’ is hardly reflected in the ENP currently. As 
far as one can suggest, resilience has provoked little interest on 
the part of the neighbours’ politicians (and even experts) and 
has been largely perceived as another new buzzword stemming 
from Brussels.  
The differences between the South and the East in the discourse 
have been rather thematic and a matter of different emphases. 
Regarding the South, stability has emerged as the key priority 
against the backdrop of the hard security threats, instability, 
and the migration crisis. With respect to the East, resilience is 
connected mainly to the reform priorities that have essentially 
remained the same since at least 2003, and that should, in the 
EU’s view, strengthen the neighbours in the face of threats that 
the EU believes stem from Russia (these discourses emphasise 
hybrid threats). However, despite different emphases, the EU 
viewed both the South and the East largely through the same 
lens of hard security and geopolitics.  
Second, the EU’s policies will likely face numerous practical 
problems. They are largely similar for the ENP’s both 
dimensions. The EU’s policies themselves have been one 
of the drivers of instability in its neighbourhood, whether 
intentionally or not. The ‘old’ stability had, in many cases, been 
negative. Yet, events have proven that even a return to that 
stability would be problematic and attaining more positive 
stability and resilience still more so. The case of the recent 
Arab upheavals demonstrates this clearly enough. The case of 
Belarus, as we have argued, shows the strengths of even some 
negative aspects of stability, compared to the more ‘reformist’ 
neighbours. Social stability is then a complex phenomenon 
that needs a careful and step-by-step approach considering 
the specificities of various social contracts. Meanwhile, it is far 
from certain that the EU has taken this into account.
Furthermore, the EU may impose its own views and ‘know-
how’ on ‘what is right and wrong’ regarding resilience and 
stability. The said would hardly be fruitful, again reproducing 
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unilateral concept and policy offered to the partners on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis. On the other hand, Brussels’s geopolitical 
considerations and scarce resources could prompt it to de 
facto uphold, in many ways, negative instances of stability 
and/or resilience in its neighbourhood. This may include the 
EU breaking its own principles. For example, fears of a large-
scale ‘explosion’ of the situation in Israel/Palestine and a lack of 
political will could provoke the EU to limit itself to supporting 
an ever less tenable negative stability and resilience there, 
while declaring to ‘increase’ the resilience of the Palestinians. 
Similarly, Brussels’s geopolitical apprehension of such Eastern 
neighbours as Moldova eventually developing closer ties with 
Russia may push the EU to condone practices in these countries 
that are negative from the viewpoint of the EU itself.
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